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The use of “responsible” autonomous systems may not be far away. Prior to developing 
or using responsible autonomous systems, it may be important to know if tactical leaders 
would make different types of decisions with automated systems than they would make 
with a human live crew. This work attempts to determine if decisions, time to make 
decisions, and confidence in decisions differ when tactical leaders rely on an autonomous 
wingman or a live wingman.  
Virtual Battlespace Simulation 2 was used to provide the virtual environment in 
which 30 military personnel completed a simulated mission that entailed five decision 
points. Participants were randomly assigned to have an autonomous or live wingman.  
Decision patterns were compared to a standard based on Army Doctrine for 
mechanized infantry Bradley sections and subject matter experts. Results indicated no 
significant group difference in decisions made, time to make decisions, and confidence in 
decisions. However, significant group differences emerged in the aspects of the wingman 
that participants trusted most and least. Although most participants indicated that they 
would not trust autonomous wingmen in real combat, results suggest that participants 
would revert to doctrinal decisions when faced with an unambiguous situation with an 
unmanned system with which they had some experience. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In 2012, the Department of Defense established a science board task force to 
review the creation and study of autonomous systems. The board’s findings established 
the need to focus more on the interaction between humans and computers/robots 
(Defense Science Board, OUSD(AT&L), 2012). Carrying on this theme, the Army 
Capabilities and Integration Command commissioned a study by RAND Arroyo on the 
benefits of pursuing unmanned systems (Robotic Systems, Joint Project Office (RS JPO), 
2011). While the study concluded that there were many benefits to unmanned ground 
systems (lower cost, fewer casualties, etc.), it also outlined some of the challenges: 
acceptance into the military culture and adaptation of tactics, techniques, and procedures 
that incorporate unmanned ground vehicles (Robotic Systems, Joint Project Office [RS 
JPO], 2011). The challenge with implementing unmanned systems is ensuring that the 
Soldiers and leaders at the tactical level will use them, and discovering how or why they 
will use them. This study attempts to determine current trust levels and review the types 
of decisions tactical leaders make with unmanned systems. The purpose is to provide 
evidence of consensus for specific tactics, techniques, and procedures when using 
unmanned systems, allowing for more refined development and fielding.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND CORRESPONDING HYPOTHESES 
Three research questions guided the study to explore decision making within 
military tactical environments while using automated ground combat systems. 
1. Do a leader’s decisions differ when using an automated system versus a 
live crew as a Bradley Section wingman? 
H0: The mean accuracy for each group’s decisions will be the same. 
 HA: The mean accuracy for each group’s decisions will be different. 
2. Does the amount of time taken to make the decisions differ when the 
leader has an autonomous wingman versus a live wingman? 
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H0: The mean time for a decision by each group will be the same. 
HA: The mean time for a decision by each group will be different. 
3. Is there a difference in the leader’s confidence when using an automated 
wingman versus live? 
H0: The confidence level of each group will be the same. 
HA: The confidence level of each group will be different.  
C. EXPLORATORY QUESTION 
 What are the benefits and drawbacks to using Virtual Battlespace 
Simulation 2 (VBS2) as a means for testing future tactical concepts?  
D. SCOPE OF THESIS 
An Army-approved simulation (Virtual Battlefield Simulation 2) was used to 
compare vehicle section leader decisions with and without an unmanned ground vehicle 
(UGV) counterpart (wingman) to that of a live wingman. The study supports U.S. Army 
interest in UGV development, informs the larger Army Research Office-sponsored 
investigations into tactical decision making and reinforces VBS2 as both a trainer and a 
research tool. The level of leader interaction within VBS2 is limited in order to force 
specific decisions and allow for clearly defined decision paths. All decisions and 
information were provided to the participant via a heads-up-display (HUD) and on-screen 
video, providing a first-person perspective. We can assume that a UGV-like display will 
return similar results to any future design. There were a total of 98 possible paths with 
two basic types of decisions, movement and tactical, which can affect the path. 
Movement decisions define whether the wingman or leader (i.e., the participant) will 
move first in the next action. Tactical decisions determine a main action, such as defend 
or assault. We refer to the participants’ chain of decisions as the decision path. Each 
decision retains a value that expresses how far away from what the study team expected 
the decision to be. We determined the value by a review of current doctrine and by 
subject matter experts (SMEs), so that a total decision path receives a quantifiable value 
called a path score. The lower the path score, the closer the actions were that would be 
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expected of a live situation. Active and retired U.S. service members from the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS), many of whom have experience with unmanned systems and 
scenario-specific activities, comprised the sample of participants. Participants were 
blocked by level of experience. The level of experience was determined using a metric of 
the participant’s demographic data, but was most heavily weighted to those with 
unmanned systems or mounted ground combat (high, mid, low).  
E. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
This study directly supports U.S. Army research into the future use of unmanned 
ground combat vehicles. The results from this study provide insight into whether 
individual decisions will change with the use of automated or semi-automated systems as 
part of ground combat teams. This provides a greater context, in general, for human-
robotic interactions; providing elements of user trust in automated systems versus trust in 
live systems. Our results could influence future design concepts as well as future 
development of doctrine for unmanned systems pertaining to fielding, training, and use. 
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION  
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter I presents the problem statement, 
research questions, scope, and benefits of the thesis. Chapter II provides the background 
information for unmanned systems in the military, studies in human-robitic integration, 
studies using virtual environments to evaluate decision making, and the lessons learned 
from the review of previous literature. Chapter III presents the participant demographics, 
the experimental design, and the methods for conducting the experiment. Chapter V 
provides the statistical methods used for analysis, results of the thesis grouped by 
hypothesis, exploratory information, and post-experiment survey results. Chapter VI 
discusses the results in summary, outlines the limitations of the study, depicts areas of 
future work, and wraps everything together with the conclusion. Several appendixes 
support the work as well as two supplemental documents that will be required for the 
replication of the study. 
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II. BACKGROUND  
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The background work for this thesis examines the use of unmanned systems in 
today’s military, studies in human-robotic integration (HRI), tactical level decision 
making processes, and the use of virtual environments for studies in decision making. We 
also provide a review of the lessons learned from the literary review that guided how we 
designed and conducted our experiment.  
B. USE OF UNMANNED SYSTEMS IN THE MILITARY 
To examine the use of unmanned systems in the military, we will first review the 
history of unmanned systems and then the growth in trust by the military for unmanned 
systems. 
1. Brief History of Unmanned Systems in the Military 
Since 2003, there has been an explosion in the use of unmanned systems in Iraq 
and Afghanistan (Cruz, 2011). While the term unmanned system is used regularly for 
these combat systems, based on the average interpretation, the systems are currently not 
completely autonomous (Defense Science Board, OUSD(AT&L), 2012). For this reason, 
we will refer to them as semi-autonomous, meaning they are controlled by an operator, 
but have some capacity for completely automated tasks. For many unmanned systems, 
however, the operator is not generally in the same vicinity as the Soldiers using the 
system and can often be on a completely different continent. Regardless of the location of 
the operators, in the author’s personal experience gained during three deployments to 
Iraq, the use of unmanned systems became increasingly prevalent from 2003 to 2010. In 
Iraq in 2003, unmanned systems were held and used almost solely by brigade levels; and 
even then, they were limited to large unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). In 2006, UAVs 
had become commonplace at the company level. By the end of 2010, unmanned systems 
could be found in all aspects of military operations, even at the platoon level. UGVs, 
ground-based systems, were mostly used by explosive ordinance units to recon or render 
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safe improvised explosive devices (IEDs), but could also be found in some platoon-level 
units and special operations forces. By 2011, more than 3,000 UGVs and over 400,000 
sorties of UAVs had been used by the U.S. Army in Iraq and Afghanistan (Cruz, 2011). 
By necessity, today’s Soldiers have become very familiar with semi-autonomous 
unmanned systems. Given an increase in these systems, it is very possible that familiarity 
has garnered trust so that individuals may make the same decisions with live team 
members as with semi-autonomous systems that have even greater autonomy.  
2. Trust in Unmanned Systems 
The increase in familiarity with unmanned systems by tactical leaders may have 
increased the level of trust in autonomous and semi-autonomous systems. Current 
unmanned systems rely on trust in both the system and the operator, with no real 
autonomy. From 2003 to 2010, trust was retained mostly with the operator, while trust in 
the system was limited to trust that the system will function. By 2010, however, there was 
more evidence that greater autonomy was given to UAVs (Hancock et al., 2011). 
Increased autonomy, in 2010, allowed UAVs, not UAV operators, to control their flights 
during simple transit from one safe area to another. The operator would only take control 
when necessary for more complex actions. The automation afforded to the use of UAVs 
indicates the link between the level of trust and the degree to which an unmanned system 
may be employed (Hancock et al., 2011). Given that greater trust may allow for a greater 
allowance of autonomy, we may expect to see changes in the decisions leaders will make 
with more advanced autonomous, or semi-autonomous, systems. Leaders may be willing 
to afford unmanned ground vehicles more autonomy in their actions provided the leaders 
have a certain degree of trust that the system will operate as expected.  
C. STUDIES ON HUMAN-ROBOTIC INTEGRATION 
Understanding of the interaction of humans with an autonomous system was 
gained through an in-depth review of works pertaining directly to human-robotic, or 
autonomous, integration (Hancock et al., 2011; Lee & See, 2004; Colebank, 2008). 
The effects of human, automated systems, and environment-related factors 
impacting perceived human-robot interaction (HRI) are evaluated and quantified using 
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meta-analytic procedures in a study conducted by the Army Research Laboratory (ARL) 
(Hancock et al., 2011). In the course of the study, the researchers found several 
characteristics of the person, the autonomous system, and the environment (see Figure 1) 
that could affect trust between human and automaton (Hancock et al., 2011). 
While personal characteristics and experiences of an individual can affect the 
degree of trust an individual has in an automated system, we are more concerned with 
aggregated responses in areas we can control for future system development. Like 
personal relationships, the degree of trust from one individual to another relies upon 
previous experience with the individuals and their own psychosocial behaviors (Hancock 
et al., 2011). By asking participants directly about their degree of trust, we mitigated the 
effect of the more individual factors that could affect trust within the study. We are 
focused on the automated and environmental characteristics that shape trust, elements 
that we can control and that will be relevant to a larger audience. 
Consistency, dependability, predictability, and reliability of an automated system 
will affect a person’s trust in the automated system (Hancock et al., 2011). According to 
the ARL study, “When an individual is not able to predict what an automated or robotic 
system is supposed to do, trust decreases” (Hancock et al., 2011, p. 6). Trust, by 
definition, requires that something is reliable (Merriam-Webster, 2014). Therefore, 
consistency, dependability, and predictability are essential to developing trust in someone 
or something. A person’s trust, however, is given in degrees. The degree of trust that is 
given is dependent on both reliable performance and societal influence. 
The cultural environment in which the automated system is operating can directly 
affect the degree of trust placed in the system. Studies have found that trust can be 
defined by the organization and that an individual’s trust can be informed by others 
within the organization (Lee & See, 2004). Also of concern are the methods of 
communication and interaction between individuals within the organization. Methods of 
communication and for tasking assignments may also affect trust within the organization 
(Hancock et al., 2011). Much of this type of trust depends on perceptions of how actions 
will occur given the communications, tasking, or the like. Trust in someone or something 
is dependent upon reliable actions performed based on commonly accepted 
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organizational interactions and beliefs. Any variance from what is expected or what is the 
norm for the organization will affect the degree of trust in whatever is violating those 
norms.  
 
Figure 1.  Factors of trust development in HRI (from Hancock et al., 2011)  
We may assume that a person’s trust in an autonomous system will affect their 
decisions, especially in a tactical situation where individuals must trust in the actions of 
their counterparts to keep them alive. Although not a military situation, firefighting has a 
similar requirement of trust to ensure resolution of a deadly situation. One study explored 
the differences between human-human teams and human-automaton teams with respect 
to communications, trust, and efficacy using a computer-based team firefighting game 
called C3Fire (Colebank, 2008). LCDR Colebank hypothesized that an automated system 
would change the interactive dynamic, which would result in decreased performance 
compared to using humans. LCDR Colebank (Colebank, 2008) conducted a between-
group experiment in which participants executed a team firefighting simulation. Four 
participants conducted two simulated scenarios (human-human and human-automaton). 
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One of the four participants acted as a confederate. The confederate played both 
scenarios, but was physically present in only one of the two scenarios. In the human-
automaton scenario, the confederate played in a separate room, portraying an automated 
agent within the simulation. Though communication techniques were the same for both 
the human-human scenario and human-automaton scenario, participants entered the 
scenarios blind to how the automated agent would actually perform. LCDR Colebank 
measured trust based on team performance, the density and types of communications, and 
results of a team efficacy questionnaire. The scenarios were counterbalanced to reduce an 
order effect.  
The results of LCDR Colebank’s study (Colebank, 2008) suggest a difference in 
how automated systems are treated and a decrease in overall performance when using 
automated systems. While no difference in the volume of messages between human-
human teams and human-robot teams existed, the types of messages sent differed. 
Participants expected more immediate responses and were more likely to override the 
actions of the confederate who was acting as an automated system. Based on participant 
comments, LCDR Colebank, concluded that there was far less trust in the automated 
confederate than the live confederate. Mission performance was decreased in the human-
automaton teams compared to the human-human teams. A grouping of success rates 
(Figure 2) shows that the performances in human-human scenarios were the same 
regardless of whether they occurred first or second. When the human-automaton scenario 
occurred first, however, there was a far greater mission failure rate than when the human-
automaton scenario occurred second. LCDR Colebank confirms that the differences in 
performance may have been caused by a participant’s lack of knowledge in how the 
automated agent would operate. By extension, this lack of knowledge may also account 
for the differences in communication types. LCDR Colebank’s results, however, clearly 
show that differences exist in communication methods, performance, and the degree of 
trust imparted by participants working in human-automaton teams (Colebank, 2008). 
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Figure 2.  Group success rates in extinguishing fires (from Colebank, 2008) 
Studies of human-robotic integration have confirmed that there is a difference in 
how humans interact with automated systems versus other humans (Colebank, 2008). 
Human interactions with automated systems rely upon several factors, only some of 
which are in regard to the automated system itself (Hancock et al., 2011). Environmental 
conditions such as an organization’s workplace culture remind us that an automated 
system must be able to interact, not just communicate, in a social context (Hancock et al., 
2011). Automated systems must inform those it interacts with on what it sees, intends, 
and can accomplish (Colebank, 2008). An automated system, that is not seen as behaving 
as expected, will not be trusted. Therefore, an automated system must be introduced to 
the existing social environment to gain the cultural trust of those with whom it will be 
working. 
D. TACTICAL DECISION MAKING 
The tactical level of warfare is “the level of war at which battles and engagements 
are planned and executed to achieve military objectives, assigned to tactical units or task 
forces” (Director for Joint Force Development, J-7, 2011, p. 359). Decisions made at the 
tactical level of warfare are referred to as tactical decisions. Specifically, for the purpose 
of this thesis, tactical level decisions are those decisions that are made by leaders of 
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tactical units conducting tactical-level operations. Decisions made at this level are 
generally required to be more reactive and dynamic, with direct feedback either through 
unit action or opponent reaction. An officer in charge of a four-vehicle platoon consisting 
of four high-mobility medium wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) and 20 personnel (five per 
vehicle) would need to make decisions about how to maneuver the vehicles from a start 
point to an objective point prior to ever actually moving. We are more concerned, 
however, with the decisions made during movement, when the platoon leadership must 
use information from his or her environment to make on-the-spot decisions that may have 
life-or-death consequences. The immediate life-or-death decisions are what, for the 
purposes of this study, we consider tactical level decisions. 
 The Army design methodology used by the U.S. Army to support decision 
making processes is a cognitive function that uses narrative construction and visual 
modeling to build a decision-making framework from the individual’s experience and 
knowledge of the situation (ADP 5-0, 2012). Building a decision framework helps 
individuals understand situations by building mental models to allow a fuller contextual 
understanding. Decision frameworks are essential to tactical decisions to allow for timely 
and accurate decisions (ADP 5-0, 2012). Narrative construction and visual modeling are 
essential for building an effective decision framework. 
Narrative construction involves the creation of a story-like background to the 
situation. It is “the conscious bounding of events and artifacts in time and space” (ADRP 
5–0, 2012, p. 2–5). For tactical situations, the narrative construction occurs as part of the 
first paragraph of the operations order. The first paragraph, or “situation” paragraph, 
explains the friendly situation, the enemy situation, and the enemy’s most probable and 
most dangerous courses of action. Before a mission, individuals are provided the 
narrative as part of their mission brief.  
Visual modeling is the use of visual graphics to better understand a situation. Like 
the narrative, this would be done during the orders process as part of the mission brief, 
prior to the actual mission. The U.S. Army uses terrain models or two-dimensional maps 
with operational graphics to represent terrain as well as for a visual simulation of the 
mission during mission rehearsals. During most rehearsals, these visual representations 
 12 
are used to explore all manner of contingencies and mission possibilities to allow more 
responsive actions from leaders at all levels (ADRP 5-0, 2012). Simulations such as 
VBS2 provide another dimension of visual modeling. Units have used virtual three-
dimensional models and virtual fly-throughs to provide greater visualization of the 
operation prior to execution. 
Leaders use information from the mission brief, terrain model, and rehearsals, 
along with their own personal experience, to build a decision framework for their actions 
within a tactical mission. Effectively, they build a list of possible situations and response 
actions to take in an “if/then” type of methodology. This methodology is supported by the 
recognition-primed decision (RPD) model (Klein & Calderwood, 1990). 
A three-year study by Klein and Calderwood (1990) evaluated the decision-
making processes of U.S. Army tank platoon leaders and fire ground commanders in real-
life situations. Based on their findings, Klein and Calderwood developed the RPD model 
(see Figure 3) to explain how decisions are made in tactical-level situations. The first step 
of the process is to determine if the situation is familiar to the decision maker. In this 
step, decision makers are comparing the current situations to those they prepared in their 
decision frameworks. If a situation is not familiar, the leaders will try to gain more 
information so that the situation matches one prepared in the decision framework. If they 
cannot find an exact match, then they will attempt to find a “best fit” (Klein & 
Calderwood, 1990).  
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Figure 3.  The Recognition-Primed Decision Model (Klein & Calderwood, 1990) 
The RPD model was developed from tactical experiences and follows Army 
doctrine in relation to how decisions are made. The first step is understanding the 
decision process being used; the next step is developing methods for quantifiably 
evaluating the decisions made by tactical leaders. The next section describes such a 
method, situation judgment tests (SJTs). The combination of the RPD method and SJTs 
can be used to quantitatively evaluate tactical decisions.  
E. STUDIES USING VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENTS FOR DECISION 
MAKING EVALUATION 
Situation judgment tests attempt to assess the knowledge, skills, values, or 
attitudes of individuals by presenting a scenario based on real events and asking the 
participant to judge and interpret the decisions made within the scenario. SJTs provide a 
scenario that can be related to actual events or doctrinal methodologies to elicit a 
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participant response that is measured against a standard built from doctrine or expert 
consensus (Legree & Psotka, 2006). 
A technique for creating the measurement standards for an SJT is the critical 
incident technique. This technique involves the use of experts to report significant events 
in their areas of expertise and the methods of resolution. By pairing these reports with 
empirical data and background research, we may be able to identify standards or rules of 
behavior that were most effective. This technique can also involve using models of 
human performance and careful deductive reasoning of existing doctrinal actions to 
evaluate decision success (Legree & Psotka, 2006). The Pacific Science and Engineering 
Group (PSE) used the critical incident technique in a decision making study with the 
United States Marine Corps in 2010.  
The PSE study used SJTs to evaluate decision making performance both before 
and after execution of a live training scenario in the Immersive Training Trainer (ITT) 
located at Camp Pendleton, California (Kobus, Kobus, Ostertag, Kelly, & Palmer, 2010). 
The ITT blends virtual and live training environments into tactical scenarios for training 
squad-sized elements. The PSE developed a computer-based SJT that mirrored the live 
scenarios and then evaluated the computer-based SJT as both a training tool prior to the 
tactical level scenario and a means for measuring unit performance afterward. 
SMEs were used to evaluate tactical level scenarios and minimize their scope to 
observable behaviors within a live tactical scenario. SMEs validated all possible decision 
paths or courses of action to ensure scenarios were realistic and robust enough for 
quantifiable evaluation in both the computer SJT and the ITT. A small group of SMEs 
were selected from the larger group to take the SJTs. Their scores were then averaged out 
to determine the expert ratings (correct answers) for the computer-based SJT and the 
tactical level scenario. The SME scores were used to create a Likert-scale against which 
the participant’s results were compared (Kobus et al., 2010). 
The findings from the PSE study show that the use of the computer-generated 
SJTs prior to the immersive training enhanced small unit performance of complex 
decision making tasks while providing quantifiable measures of performance for both the 
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immersive environment and the SJT. The techniques used by the PSE group broke down 
into some simple ideas. Decision making is complex, and there is no one perfectly right 
answer. The PSE group also validated those choices with SMEs in an attempt to 
determine an approximate “right choice.” This right choice, spread out amongst all of the 
choices, allowed for a baseline value upon which other choices could be evaluated.  
Based on these studies, it appears that virtual environments could be used in 
cooperation with SJTs to provide a means for testing decision making, provided the 
scenarios are developed to a rigorous standard based on doctrinal theory and validated by 
SMEs. It should, therefore, be possible to test if leaders’ decisions change when using an 
unmanned system versus a live counterpart. 
1. Using VBS2 to Test Decision Making 
Virtual Battlespace Simulation 2 is an Army program of record created by 
Bohemia Interactive (BI) Group. Bohemia Interactive consists of companies in the U.S., 
Australia, and Czech Republic. Initially, BI Group was a computer game company, but 
after the production of Operation Flashpoint, the U.S. Army asked them to create 
DARWARS Ambush. Over several years, BI Group worked with the U.S. Army, U.S. 
Marine Corps, and Australian Defense Force to build successively better iterations of 
Virtual Battlespace Simulation that were more tailored to military simulations and 
simulators. Recently, Bohemia Interactive was awarded a contract to provide VBS3, an 
even more developed version. We chose VBS2 because it met all requirements for 
providing a virtual environment, the project team’s previous experience with the 
simulation and the general within the U.S. Army.  
F. LESSONS LEARNED FROM LITERARY REVIEW 
Previous studies and literature have provided many key lessons that were helpful 
for the design of the experiment and data collection techniques. Understanding human-
robotic trust, decision making, and methods of data collection were key considerations 
used for the design and execution of the experiment.  
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1. Understanding Human-Robotic Trust 
ARL’s study of human-robotic trust outlined how interactions between human 
and autonomous systems could increase or decrease trust (Hancock et al., 2011). Primary 
to the trust relationship was the reliability of the system to do what it was expected to do. 
LCDR Colebank confirmed this premise, but also outlined an important aspect of 
executing this kind of experiment—participants must have some expectations for how the 
autonomous agent will perform (Colebank, 2008). LCDR Colebank’s study allowed data 
to be skewed by people who had no understanding of the autonomous system’s 
capabilities and expected actions other than what would be provided. Therefore, we 
created a training scenario that trained all participants in the use of the unmanned system. 
While there was a risk of building too much trust, individual’s preconceived ideas and 
organizational bias would counter the limited familiarity gained from the training 
scenario (Hancock et al., 2011).  
2. Decision Making 
Army doctrinal methods for decision making imparted the importance of 
providing a means for the participant to build a decision framework to be used within the 
mission scenarios. Key elements for the creation of the framework included having a 
narrative and visual models (ADP 5-0, 2012). To allow a participant to build an effective 
decision framework, we provided a situational narrative (see Appendix G) at the start of 




Figure 4.  Operational graphic provided at the start of the scenario 
The mission narrative, two-dimensional map, and participant’s experience 
allowed for the creation of a decision framework that helped participants execute their 
decisions. 
3. Methods of Data Collection 
All the participants’ decisions had to be collected and quantified to allow for 
statistical analysis. The PSE’s use of SJTs provided a basis of validity to Legree and 
Psotka’s use of the critical incident techniques for the development of quantifiably 
evaluated scenarios (Kobus et al., 2010; Legree & Psotka, 2006). The PSE’s methods for 
constraining the scope of its evaluation and Legree and Psotka’s use of doctrine and 
subject matter experts were techniques that wused for this experiment that were 
invaluable to the creation of scenarios and data collection techniques.  
 18 





Participants of this research were students and faculty of the Naval Postgraduate 
School with a cross level of U.S. military experience. The project team recruited 
participants via e-mail, social and organizational network communications (i.e., the NPS 
muster page), and by word of mouth. Mr. Jesse Huston, a civilian employee, scheduled 
the participants to avoid any possibility of coercion due to rank or position. 
Participants were screened through voluntary completion of a survey form 
(Appendix B) that assessed their military experience, unmanned systems experience, and 
individual demographics (age, sex, etc.). Part of the survey included a test (see Appendix 
C) of the participant’s tactical knowledge of Army mounted doctrine. Demographic 
information was not used to screen out any participants, but was used to block 
participants and for predictive and qualitative analysis. 
Thirty participants completed the experiment from four services: Army (54%), 
Marine Corps (40%), Navy (3%), and Air Force (3%). Tables 1 and 2 show the 
participant demographic. No statistically significant differences existed between groups 
in any of the demographic categories. 
 
 
Table 1.   Demographic characteristics of the participants, mean (SD). 
DEMOGRAPHICS (Numerical Data) Total Mean
Years of Service 12.22 (4.49)
Combat Tours 2.1 (1.40)
Length of Tours 8.58 (3.58)
Knowledge Test 2.1 (0.92)
% of Service Mounted 35% (6%)
% of Unmanned System Experience 14% (22%)
Age 34.53 (5.61)





















Table 2.   Demographic information of a categorical nature and displayed by 
frequency counts 
DEMOGRAPHICS (Categorical Data) LIVE UGV Total Count
M 14 15 29
F 1 0 1
USA 6 10 16
USMC 7 5 12
USN 1 0 1
USAF 1 0 1
Combat Arms 8 10 18
Special Forces 1 1 2
Service Support 2 2 4
Combat Service Support 4 2 6
Yes 4 5 9
Yes - but not leader 2 2 4
No 9 8 17
Conventional 0 0 0
Low Intensity 6 7 13
Both 3 3 6
N/A 6 5 11
High 4 4 8
Mid 8 9 17
Low 3 2 5
Both 2 7 9
Tracked 0 0 0
Wheeled 8 4 12
None 5 4 9
Yes 10 9 19
No 5 6 11
Used 0 2 2
Operated 0 0 0
Directed 4 5 9
Used and Operated 1 0 1
Used and Directed 3 2 5
Operated and Directed 0 0 0
Used Operated and Directed 0 2 2
No 7 4 11
Unmanned System Experience




Direct Contact Experienced 




Using the demographic data and the participant’s tactical knowledge test score, 
participants were blocked into experience groups, with random assignment into the live 
or UGV group, as shown in Figure 5. Experience levels were calculated using a metric of 
the participant demographic that produced a total numerical value (see Appendix H). 
Eight participants were placed in the high-experience group (285 and above), 17 in the 
mid-experience group (157–284), and five in the low-experience group (0–156). Figure 5 
shows the breakdown between experience and treatment groups. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Representation of how participants were blocked by experience and then 
divided into treatment groups 
B. DESIGN 
The experimental design for this study relied upon four tenets—control, 
randomization, replication, and blocking. By using these tenets, we created a design 
concept (see Figure 6) that drove the methodology of the study, conduct of the 
experiment, and subsequent analysis techniques. We first blocked participants by 
experience level and then randomly assigned to either the live wingman or UGV 
scenarios, and their decisions, decision-making time, and confidence and trust in their 
wingman were measured. 
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Figure 6.  Participant blocking and treatment groups 
1. Control 
This study involved several sources of variability. Primary sources of variability 
existed in the participant’s decisions, the wingman’s actions, and the actions of the 
scenario’s friendly and enemy artificial intelligence (AI).  
To control variability from the participants, we developed scenarios that limited 
their possible decisions to a maximum of four. The goal was to omit possible responses 
that were outside of the research intent while simplifying the participant’s decision 
process into measurable selections.  
We had intended that the participant’s wingman for the live scenario should be a 
human confederate, but in order to control variability in responses between the live and 
automated wingmen, we opted to use the simulation’s artificial intelligence for both the 
automated wingman and live wingman. By coding in replicated human responses, we 
were able to provide the appearance of a live counterpart, but with the assurance that the 
wingman’s actions would be the same for every scenario. 
We used scripting (a form of computer code for interacting with the simulation) to 




controlled by the simulation’s artificial intelligence programming would remain 
consistent, thus ensuring that all participants received the same cognitive stimulus for 
their decisions. 
2. Randomization 
We assigned participants at random to their individual treatments, ensuring that 
there was no bias in participant groups. We did, however, identify that there may be some 
variability caused by experience, which necessitated blocking by experience. 
3. Replication 
The use of a virtual environment allowed for scripting of both the scenario and the 
wingman’s actions to ensure that each participant replicated the same study. The only 
things that changed between participants were the results of their independent decisions. 
The scenario and the experience was the same for each participant depending on his or 
her group. Also, because our study was documented in code, it can be replicated at other 
locations and facilities to allow for continued experimentation and analysis. 
4. Blocking 
Using a metric of key demographic data (Appendix H) described above, 
participants were blocked into experience levels—high, mid, low. The use of a metric 
ensured that participants could not be assigned due to bias. Participants in each block 
were then randomly assigned to their treatment groups based on the numbers of 
individuals needed to ensure equal distribution.  
C. SCENARIOS  
We designed scenarios within the virtual simulation, VBS2, to approximate a 
conventional conflict. Scenarios presented participants with a mission to conduct a 
movement to contact north as part of a Bradley vehicle section, in order to gain contact 
with enemy infantry forces.  
The scenario started with a movement decision. Participants were informed that 
they would be moving using the travelling technique and were asked who should lead or 
 24 
who should follow. Travelling is the term used for movement when contact is not likely 
and speed is necessary (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2001). In the course of 
their movement, participants encountered an enemy scout vehicle. After killing the 
enemy scout, the participants had to decide whether to defend from their current position 
continue movement using the travelling overwatch technique, or continue movement 
using the bounding overwatch technique. Participants who chose to defend then had to 
decide which battle positions to occupy and the order in which to move to the positions. 
Participants who chose to conduct travelling or bounding overwatch then had to decide 
who should lead the movement. When the movement was complete, the participants were 
presented with enemy infantry. Once the wingman identified the enemy, the participant 
had to decide who would provide suppressive fire (the participant or the wingman) and 
who would assault the infantry position. 
1. User Interface 
The UGV and live wingman scenarios were coded in such a way that all 
interactions were limited to those options presented in the HUD and pop-up dialog 
windows. In general, the HUD allowed participants to communicate with their vehicle 
gunner or with their wingman in very basic terms. Participants also had the ability to 
control the commander’s independent viewer (CIV) which controlled what they could see 
on the battlefield. Figure 7 shows a picture of the HUD. Appendix I provides a larger 
detailed view with descriptions of the components of the HUD. 
Participants could command their gunner or wingman to engage targets. The 
participant’s gunner, however, would fire in the direction indicated by the participant’s 
CIV. The wingman would only fire if an enemy threat had been identified. When 
commanding their vehicle gunner to fire, participants had to click the fire command for 
every three- to five-round burst. When commanding the wingman to fire, the participant 
only had to give the command once. The participant was able to switch the type of 
weapon system his or her gunner used from the m240mm coaxial machine gun to the 
25mm cannon. The participant could order the wingman to ignore a target if the 
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participant wanted the wingman to stop firing or to scan in other directions. The 
wingman, however, could never go back to that target again.  
 
Figure 7.  Live and UGV Heads-up-display 
In addition to the basic controls, the participants were provided a map with unit 
icons that updated when vehicles moved within the simulation. The map also displayed 
an icon for enemy forces, when identified by the wingman. An example of the HUD for 
the UGV scenario in Figure 8 shows how the map and participant’s view were arranged. 
Figure 8 also shows the UGV camera that provided the participant a visual of what the 
UGV saw, some textual information about identified targets and the condition of the 
UGV’s weapon system. 
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Figure 8.  Graphical user interface for UGV Scenario 
2. Practice Scenario 
The practice scenario provided the user all the general information needed to 
conduct the scenario. Participants were allowed to conduct the scenario more than once, 
though only a handful utilized this option. In addition to familiarizing the participant with 
the basic controls, the practice scenario allowed the user to become familiar with the 
capabilities of the UGV. Because participants from both the live and UGV scenarios 
conducted the same practice scenario, both had some relative familiarization with the 
UGV capabilities from which to answer the post-survey questions. 
Participants conducting the practice scenario were first introduced to the interface 
and provided a guided tour of the various features. They were then allowed to practice 
engaging stationary targets in order to practice targeting and engaging with their own 
vehicle gunner. After destroying two targets, one close and one far, participants were 
introduced to how the UGV would communicate that it had acquired a target (ping noise 
followed by a zoom into the target by the UGV camera). They were then asked to tell the 
UGV to engage the target, and they witnessed its ability to accurately engage and destroy 
an enemy force. Following the engagement, participants were presented a decision dialog  
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screen similar to what would be used in the test scenario. Participants then decided which 
direction to move and witnessed their section’s execution of the movement. For the 
practice scenario, the UGV always followed. 
Once complete, participants were asked if they wanted to conduct the practice 
scenario again and were assigned their group, either live or UGV. The scenarios for the 
live and UGV groups were identical except for the methods of communication between 
the wingman and the participant. Therefore, although the scenarios were identical, some 
key differences in methods of interaction were scripted into each scenario. 
3. UGV Scenario 
The UGV’s method of communication consisted of a visual representation of the 
UGV’s camera in the upper right corner, textual output displayed under the camera 
image, and audible pings. The camera provided a constant feed to the participant, 
informing him or her of where the UGV was looking. In addition, the UGV provided 
textual input directly beneath the camera. This information presented a GPS location for 
the UGV and information on any targets, if identified, to include location, target type (if 
known), and battle damage assessment (BDA). Target information included range, 
direction, and distance. A small vehicle silhouette provided the participant an idea of the 
UGV’s weapon orientation in relation to the vehicle, and textual data provided 
information on the current weapon status (armed or safe). Lastly, the UGV 
communicated to the participant via audible pings. These pings alerted the participant to 
the fact that the UGV had identified a target.  
A fully autonomous system would have been allowed to engage the target on its 
own. But we decided to require a human to make the final decision to fire in order to be 
more realistic to the more immediate use of unmanned ground vehicles. Thus, upon 
identifying an enemy target, the UGV elicited an audible ping and then waited for the 
user to give the command to fire. The UGV then began engaging the target as directed. In 
addition to the audible ping, the UGV’s camera would also zoom in on the target. Once 
the target was destroyed, the camera would zoom out to the wider field of view. BDA 
was then provided in the target status block of the UGV information window.  
 28 
4. Live Scenario 
A single text block and audio radio messages comprised the live scenario 
interface. In today’s modern combat, most message traffic at the tactical level is relayed 
either with a radio or with the Future Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2). The 
FBCB2 provides a map image with icons representing various friendly units and tactical 
messages. FBCB2 allows written communication between individuals on the battlefield. 
In the live scenario, the textual window in the upper right corner of the participant’s HUD 
provided these textual messages from the faux live wingman.  
In addition to the textual messages, radio traffic was simulated by recording the 
voice of the administrator. The voice recording was then scheduled to play at key 
moments in the scenario, such as when enemy threats were identified or had been 
destroyed. Participants, however, were informed that while they would receive the 
wingman’s radio messages, their own communication would be limited to the HUD and 
the clickable buttons on the screen. The intent of the audio radio traffic was to provide a 
more convincing “live” scenario. A few participants attempted to shout back at the 
wingman, indicating some success in the ruse. 
Although the methods of communication were key components of both the UGV 
and live scenarios, they were only a means to immerse the participant into the scenario—
live or UGV. In addition to representing the live or UGV scenarios, we had to incorporate 
a means for requesting, capturing, and measuring the participants’ decisions.  
D. MEASURES 
We utilized quantifiable methods to measure a participant’s response within the 
scenario as well as their survey questions in the post-experiment survey. Each 
participant’s decisions and opinions could then be analyzed against the total sample using 
statistical methods to compare results.  
1. Scenario Decision Measures 
We rated decisions to provide an individual path score for each participant. The 
sum of all the decisions generated the path score.  
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a. Path Score 
Each scenario involved four decisions broken down into two basic categories—
movement or tactical. A movement decision involved the participant’s choosing to either 
lead or follow during a movement, regardless of what type of movement (travelling, 
travelling overwatch, or bounding overwatch). A tactical decision required a decision 
about how to employ the participant’s section to achieve a goal. Depending on the 
decisions the participant made, he or she would move down a specific path of actions. 
Figure 9 shows that the paths are fairly straightforward, except for the ability to select 
more information. Participants could request more information, which afforded them 
more time to make a decision. By selecting more information, participants were given 10 
additional seconds to scan the battlefield with their CIVs and 40 additional seconds to 
make a decision. This option, however, could only be selected four times in total. Very 
few participants utilized this feature, and those who did tended to think they would 
receive another pop-up with even more information.  
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Figure 9.  Decision path and scoring 
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In order to conduct a quantifiable comparison of decisions, a value, or score, had 
to be attributed to each decision. Decisions were scored based on a review of doctrine and 
consensus from SMEs. If a participant chose the expected decision, his or her score for 
that decision would be zero. The more the participant diverged from what was expected, 
the higher the score would be for that decision. The sum of participant’s scores for each 
decision is referred to as the path score. The path score was the overall measure of 
decision performance.  
b. Movement Decision One 
Movement decision one was the first decision for the participant, requiring the 
participant to decide who would lead and who would follow when using the movement 
technique of “travelling.” Participants received a 0 if they chose to follow and a 1 if they 
chose to lead. At the end of the movement, participants encountered an enemy scout that 
they had to destroy. The participants’ instructions to their gunners to fire and any 
command to their wingmen to fire were recorded using a time stamp and an indicator of 
the action taken. 
c. Tactical Decision One 
Participants chose to either defend or move into one of two movement techniques 
(travelling overwatch or bounding overwatch) following their encounter with the enemy 
scout. Travelling overwatch is used when contact is possible but speed is necessary. Both 
vehicles move, but one moves in such a way as to ensure that it can provide relative 
security and early warning for the other. Bounding overwatch is used when contact is 
expected; it consists of the two vehicles conducting either alternating or successive 
bounds. One vehicle provides security and early warning while the other vehicle moves. 
Once the vehicle that was moving is set in a good position, it provides security so that the 
vehicle that had been providing security can move. Participants’ who chose to defend 
received a 2, travelling overwatch received a 1, and bounding overwatch received a 0. 
Following their selections, participants either moved to the defensive positions or 
continued their movement forward using the movement technique selected. 
 32 
d. Movement Decision Two  
During movement decision two, those who choose defend decide who will 
provide security first, while the other vehicle moves to its defensive position (battle 
position). Participants who chose to move to their position first received a 1, while those 
who chose to let their wingmen occupy their position first received a 0. 
Participants who chose to conduct travelling overwatch or bounding overwatch 
had to choose both who would lead and who would follow for the next movement. 
Scoring was the same for this decision as movement decision one, so that those who 
chose to follow would receive a 0 and those who chose to lead would receive a 1. 
e. Tactical Decision Two 
Those who chose to defend must then choose who would occupy each of the two 
battle positions. The google map provided participants information about where the 
positions were located and gave them an idea of the terrain. Battle position 1 was more 
restrictive than the other and was more at risk of infantry attack. Battle position 2 had 
longer fields of view and less risk. Those who chose battle position 1 for themselves 
received a 0, and those who chose battle position 2 received a 1. 
After the first bound, those who chose to conduct travelling or bounding 
overwatch made contact with enemy infantry moving in the tree line to their front. 
Participants decided if they wanted to act as the support-by-fire or the assault element. 
The support-by-fire element suppresses or destroys the enemy force with long-range 
aimed fires while the assault element maneuvers to a position that allows it to close with 
and destroy the enemy force. Those who chose the support-by-fire position received a 1, 
while those who chose the assault position received a 0. 
2. Time to Make Decision  
Computer system time tracked when the scenarios began and ended. In addition, 
to calculate the time between decisions, each decision was time stamped with the 
computer system time. By calculating the time between the start and finish, we were able  
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to generate the time the participant took to complete the scenario. In addition, we could 
calculate the time used to make a decision by calculating the time difference between the 
each decision.  
E. EQUIPMENT 
The equipment used for this work included software and hardware that allowed 
for both the conduct of the experiment and the analysis. Software used to execute the 
experiment included the Virtual Battlespace Simulation 2 program, Netbeans, Websocket 
Gateway, and Global Mapper. Hardware used to conduct both the experiment and the 
analysis included an Alienware computer, monitor, and the necessary input devices. 
Software tools for data collection and post analysis of results included notepad, JMP Pro 
10, and Microsoft Excel. 
1. Software 
Virtual Battlespace Simulation 2, Netbeans, Websocket Gateway, and Global 
Mapper were used to create the total scenario experience. VBS2 provided the virtual 
environment. Netbeans provided the basis from which to code the websocket gateway 
and the means to run the websocket gateway code. The websocket gateway acted as a 
means to translate data from VBS2 to the google map page. Global Mapper helped to 
convert from the VBS2 map to modified google tiles. 
a. Virtual Battlespace Simulation 2  
VBS2 is part of the Army’s Games for Training program of record (McCaney, 
2014). It is a 3D first-person networkable simulation that provides realistic semi-
immersive environments over large and dynamic terrain areas with hundreds of simulated 
military and civilian entities (Milgaming, 2010). The terrain consists of both geo-specific 
and geo-typical terrains. Models within VBS2 consist of the latest Army, Marine Corps, 
and Navy equipment. VBS2, which comes with an integrated scenario editor, allows for 
scripting actions and scenarios and can communicate via distributed interactive 
simulation (DIS) and high-level architecture (HLA) protocols (Milgaming, 2010). VBS2 
is an Army-adopted training medium that is familiar to the author, which made it a good 
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fit for the project. The networkable characteristics and ability to script scenarios provided 
a diverse platform from which to run a controlled experiment. Milgaming provided 
training in how to administer VBS2 and some instruction in basic scripting techniques 
was provided by Milgaming. In addition, Milgaming also provided the code for the UGV 
HUD which was then modified for the live HUD by the project team. All other support 
for utilizing and scripting in VBS2 came from the VBS2 wiki provided by Bohemia 
Interactive Simulations (Bohemia Interactive Simulations, 2014). 
b. Netbeans and Websocket Gateway 
Websocket Gateway is an open source program created by Professor Don 
McGregor at the Naval Postgraduate School. The code was slightly modified to allow 
interaction with VBS2 DIS protocol traffic and Google Maps. The Websocket Gateway 
utilized websockets to create a gateway between VBS2 and the Google Maps interface. 
Netbeans was utilized to run the Websocket Gateway and adjust the code for the use 
within the experiment. 
c. Global Mapper 
Global Mapper is included with the VBS2 developer suite and allows for 
interaction with 2D maps with 3D data. Exporting the VBS2 map for the scenario in a 
TIF format, Global Mapper was used to convert the map into Google tiles for 
representation in the Google interface and as part of the Websocket Gateway. 
2. Hardware 
An Alienware computer, model Aurora R4, consisting of an Intel® Core™ i7–
3930K CPU with 32 GB RAM running at 3.20GHz utilized a 64-bit Microsoft Windows 
8 Operating System to facilitate the experiment. VBS2 and Netbeans were loaded onto 
the computer and all additional programs were built into the system. A standard keyboard 
and mouse provided a means for user input, though participants only utilized the mouse. 
The display was provided by a 32-inch LED HDTV (720p, 60Hz) manufactured by 
Sceptre. 
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3. Data Collection Systems and Software 
Notepad, Microsoft Excel 2010, and JMP Pro-10 were utilized to store and 
conduct statistical analysis on data. All files exported from VBS2 were in text format 
(.txt) and were read by Notepad. Files were stored by subject ID in folders similarly 
labeled. All demographic data was transferred immediately from demographic surveys 
and the experience test prior to the commencement of the scenario. Formulas within 
Excel allowed immediate calculation of experience levels. Excel maintained a running 
count of all participants assigned to each experience level by group. Following the 
completion of the scenario, all data from the output text file was transferred to Excel 
either manually or by importing text data. Initial data counts and preliminary analysis was 
computed in Excel and then verified in JMP. JMP Pro 10, 64-bit edition, was utilized for 
the majority of statistical calculations and graphical representations. JMP Pro is the 
advanced analytics version of JMP, providing visual data access and manipulation, as 
well as guided support for the methods and results of statistical calculations.  
F. SURVEYS 
All participants conducted survey’s to support the experiment. Demographics 
survey’s conducted prior to the experiment provided basic information about the 
participants and aided in determining how the participant would be blocked. A tactical 
knowledge test conducted prior to the experiment allowed a means to measure a 
participant’s knowledge of Army doctrinal terms that were used in the experiment. This 
further supported the blocking of the participant by experience. Post surveys conducted 
after the experiment provided participant insights into their own decisions and their 
feelings about their wingman. 
1. Demographic Survey  
The demographic survey included typical demographic questions along with 
specific questions that could indicate a participant’s experience level in both mounted 
combat and unmanned systems (Appendix B). Some of the key questions included 
a. Have you had any experience with unmanned vehicles?  
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b. What kind of mounted vehicle experience do you have? 
2. Tactical Experience Test 
The tactical knowledge test assessed an individual’s knowledge of the Army-
defined doctrinal terms utilized within the scenario (Appendix C). Three multiple choice 
questions comprised the test: 
a. What is a movement to contact? 
b. Of the three movement techniques, Travelling, Travelling-Overwatch, 
Bounding-Overwatch; what are the main differences and when are they used? 
c. Using several pictures of various formation types, indicate at which position the 
leader should be.  
3. Post-Experiment Survey 
The post-experiment survey captured why participants made their specific 
decisions, their overall confidence in their decisions, and their level of trust in their 
wingman following the scenario. Participants were asked to indicate their level of trust in 
the wingman’s accuracy of information, expected actions, and knowledge of situation. 
Lastly, participants were asked if they would trust an automated system in the future and 
to explain why (Appendix D). 
G. PROCEDURES 
In order to conduct our study and ensure reliable results, we had to implement 
strict procedures to avoid errors by issues. 
1. Control Procedures 
To eliminate extraneous variables, control procedures used in this study included 
scripted directions, standardized mission briefings, scripted computer-based simulations, 
blocking by experience, and random assignment to treatment groups.  
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2. Before the Experiment  
Prior to the arrival of the participant, the participant’s name was listed next to a 
confidential list of subject IDs and participant contact information. After the information 
was recorded the document was secured. From that point on, the participant was only 
referred to by his or her subject ID. After determining the subject ID to use, 
administrators initiated the primary scenario computer and all necessary programs. A 
second computer was turned on outside of the lab area and VBS2 was started on this 
computer as well. The participant walked past the second computer when he or she 
entered the room. The computer’s presence and visible use of VBS2 was meant to further 
impart the belief that the wingman for the live scenarios was a real person. Once all 
computers and software were running, individual subject folders were created in both 
hard copy and digital formats. A hard copy folder was utilized for all surveys and the 
consent form. A digital folder was established on the computer and appropriate naming 
conventions (subject ID) were verified in the scenario script allowing export to the digital 
folder. Subject IDs were updated in the Microsoft Excel data file and checked against 
existing subject IDs to verify that no duplicates occurred.  
Upon arrival, participants were greeted and thanked for their participation. 
Following introductions, they were briefed from an initial script which outlined the 
experiment, its purpose, and the volunteer nature of the study. All participants were then 
allowed to read through the consent form (Appendix F) before signing. After signing the 
consent form, participants filled out the demographic survey and tactical knowledge test. 
The participants experience was determined using their demographic survey and tactical 
knowledge test. Participants were blocked by their experience into a groups(high, mid, or 
low experience) and then randomly assigned to a treatment (UGV or live) within their 
assigned group.  
Participants were provided a practice scenario so they could become familiar with 
both the user interface and the unmanned ground vehicle before conducting the mission 
scenario. All participants went through the same practice scenario and utilized the UGV 
interface. After the participants became familiar with the interface and practice scenario, 
the administrator reloaded the scenario to the main menu and reinstituted the Google Map 
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interface and Websocket Gateway to ensure these programs were operational for the 
current scenario.  
A copy of the mission brief for the scenario was laminated to the table in front of 
the participant. The participant was informed to read the mission brief prior to conducting 
the scenario. In a very few cases, the mission brief was given verbally as well. In all 
cases, the administrators answered any questions about the mission. If conducting the live 
scenario, the participant was informed that the wingman would be one of the 
administrators and that the administrator would operate the wingman vehicle from a 
computer in the adjoining room. When both the administrator and the participant were 
ready, the participant was instructed to select his or her specific scenario type as indicated 
in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10.  Main menu provided scenario selections of Live, UGV, or Training. 
3. During the Experiment 
For those conducting the UGV scenario, one or both administrators were always 
present. For those conducting the live scenario, one administrator remained in the room 
while the other stayed outside in an attempt to further build the belief that the wingman 
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was a live person. The participant navigated through the scenario utilizing a mouse at 
each decision point within the scenario. After starting their particular scenarios (live or 
UGV), the participants were provided information that contact was not likely for the first 
5 kilometers during their movement to check point 1 (CP1), after which contact would 
become likely. The participants were then asked if they would like to lead or follow (see 
Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11.  Movement Decision One: lead or follow wingman 
Participants then scanned around their positions as the vehicles maneuvered based 
on the participants’ decisions. The lead vehicle slowed its movement to allow for the trail 
vehicle to catch up prior to reaching CP1; this allowed both vehicles to come online prior 
to cresting the hill. Upon cresting the hill, an enemy scout vehicle was identified. 
Depending on the participant’s previous decision, the scout may have been identified first 
by the wingman or participant. Once the scout was identified, the participant either took 
action to engage the enemy scout vehicle from his or her vehicle, had the wingman 
engage, or both (see Figure 12). 
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Figure 12.  Enemy Scout identified by participant and UGV in UGV scenario 
After the enemy scout was destroyed, the pop-up window for tactical decision one 
was presented to the participants. The participants were informed that they had made 
contact with enemy reconnaissance and asked if they wanted to defend, transition to the 
travelling overwatch movement technique, or transition to the bounding overwatch 
movement technique (see Figure 13). 
 
Figure 13.  Tactical Decision One: defend, travelling overwatch, bounding overwatch 
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If participants chose to defend, they were provided another pop-up window, 
tactical decision two, that asked if they wanted to defend from battle position 1 (BP1) or 
battle position 2 (BP2). BP1 and BP2 locations were related using check point graphics 
available on the participants’ maps (see Figure14).  
 
Figure 14.  Tactical Decision Two, defense path: BP1 or BP2 
Once the participants selected one of the two options, they were then provided the 
movement decision two pop-up. Participants were asked if they wanted to move first 
while the wingman provided overwatch, or if they wanted the wingman to move first 
while they provided the wingman overwatch (see Figure 15). After this selection, the 
scenario was ended. 
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Figure 15.  Movement Decision Two, defense path: lead or follow 
If participants chose either travelling overwatch or bounding overwatch, they 
were then provided movement decision two. Movement decision two asked the 
participant to decide who should lead the movement or who should follow (see Figure 
16). After making their selections, the participants again scanned while their vehicles 
moved according to their decision.  
 
Figure 16.  Movement Decision Two, non-defense path: lead or follow 
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Once both vehicles were online on the other side of the hill, just past the dead 
enemy scout, the participant and his or her wingman were able to identify enemy 
infantry. In the majority of cases, the wingman identified enemy infantry first regardless 
of movement technique. Once the wingman identified the enemy, the final decision was 
presented: tactical decision two. Tactical decision two asked the participants if they 
would like to assault the enemy dismounts themselves while their wingmen provided 
support-by-fire or vice versa (see Figure 17). Following their selections, the scenario was 
ended.  
 
Figure 17.  Tactical Decision Two for non-defend paths: Assault or support by fire 
4. After the Experiment 
After the last decision, the participant was provided his or her final score. 
Regardless of how close or divergent the participants were in their final path scores, they 
were informed that they did a good job. Prior to the post-survey, administrators filled in 
the types of decisions made at each decision point and then verified that what was 
observed was what was stored in the digital subject folder. Participants were then 
provided the post-survey and given as much time as needed to complete it. An 
administrator would then look over the information and ensure completion before 
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conducting a debriefing. All participants were debriefed on the use of deception in the 
study, whether they were deceived (live group) or not (UGV group). Debriefing also 
consisted of reviewing the importance of the study and how the participant’s involvement 
supported the research. A basic graphical depiction of results by group was provided for 
those participants who were interested in the data collected,. Participants were asked not 
to inform anyone else as to the deception and were provided a copy of their consent 
forms prior to departure. All participants were thanked for their participation. 
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IV. RESULTS 
A. STATISTICAL METHODS 
Prior to conducting analyses, we checked the assumptions and conditions for each 
statistical method. Both the UGV and live group were independent as was the data for 
each group. The total sample size was sufficiently large (15 per group, 30 total). 
Individual characteristics of data for each hypothesis, however, required different 
statistical methods and evaluation for each. 
Path score was the sum of all the decisions, resulting in an ordinal data type. We 
used the Wilcoxon Rank Sum to test the ordinal values between the two groups (live and 
UGV). Individual decision data and post-test survey data were categorical, lending to use 
of Chi-Square tests. Some factors within the decision data had too low a count to provide 
any relevant feedback (see Table 3). For those decisions, the outliers were excluded from 
the data.  
 
Table 3.   Frequency of decision selections by type. 
Decision times, confidence in decisions, and trust in wingman comprised 
continuous values, and therefore the two sample t-test was used to test between group 
differences in decision time. Where sample standard deviations between groups were not 
sufficiently close, Welch’s Test was used to account for the variance. Whenever there 
were outliers, we conducted statistical analysis with and without outliers to determine if 
there was statistical significance with or without the outliers.  
 
LEAD FOLLOW DEFEND TRAV OW BOUND OW LEAD FOLLOW SBF ASLT BP1 BP2
LIVE 7 8 0 8 7 4 11 9 6 0 0
UGV 9 6 1 4 10 7 8 5 4 1 0
MD1 TD1 MD2 TD2
TD2 - Tactical Decision 2
MD2 - Movement Decision 2
TD1 - Tactical Decision 1
MD1 - Movement Decision 1
ASLT - Assault
SBF - Support by Fire
BOUND OW - Bounding Overwatch
TRAV OW - Travelling Overwatch
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Preliminary Results 
Figure 7 provides a representation of decision paths by frequency and flow with 
the percentage of participants who chose various paths. The most common path was to 
lead the initial movement, then transition to bounding overwatch after initial contact, 




Figure 18.  Decision path selections 
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B. HYPOTHESIS 1—THE MEAN ACCURACY OF EACH GROUP’S 
DECISIONS WILL BE THE SAME. 
We first tested Hypothesis 1 by examining whether group differences occurred for 
the global measure of decisions, the path score. Next, group comparisons for each of the 
five decisions were made. 
1. Path Scores  
Figure 19 shows that there was no statistically significant difference in 
path scores between the live and UGV groups (z = 0.34, p = 0.73).  
 
Figure 19.  Path score by group 
2. Movement Decision One 
There was no statistical significance between groups (X
2
(1) = 0.537, p = 0.464). 
Additionally, there was no statistical significance between those who chose to lead 
(n=16) and those who chose to follow (n=14), regardless of group (Z = 0.232, p = 0.591). 
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Table 4.   Contingency table for movement Decision One, comparison 
between groups 
3. Tactical Decision One 
One outlier, a single participant who chose to defend, was excluded from the 
analyses (see Figure 21). There was no statistically significant difference in tactical 
decision one between travelling overwatch and bounding overwatch (X
 2
(1) =1.857, p = 
0.1730). There was no statistically significant difference in the proportion of people who 
chose bounding overwatch (n = 17) versus travelling overwatch (n = 12), regardless of 
group (Z = 0.66, p = 0.745). 
  
Table 5.   Contingency table for tactical Decision One, comparison between 
groups 
count 8 count 7 ROW Count 15
total % 26.67% total % 23.33% ROW Total % 50.00%
col % 57.14% col % 43.75%
row % 53.33% row % 46.67%
count 6 count 9 ROW Count 15
total % 20.00% total % 30.00% ROW Total % 50.00%
col % 42.86% col % 56.25%
row % 40.00% row % 60.00%
COL Count 14 COL Count 16




count 7 count 8 ROW Count 15
total % 24.14% total % 27.59% ROW Total % 51.72%
col % 41.18% col % 66.67%
row % 46.67% row % 53.33%
count 10 count 4 ROW Count 14
total % 34.48% total % 13.79% ROW Total % 48.28%
col % 58.82% col % 33.33%
row % 71.43% row % 28.57%
COL Count 17 COL Count 12
COL Total % 58.62% COL Total% 41.38%




4. Movement Decision Two 
There was no statistical significance (X
 2
(1) =1.304, p = 0.253) between groups 
for their decisions in movement decision two (Figure 22). The trend across all 
participants was toward following (n = 19) vice leading (n =11) (Z = 1.03, p = 0.063). 
  
Table 6.    Contingency table for movement Decision Two, comparison 
between groups 
5. Tactical Decision Two 
There was no significant difference (X
 2
(1) =3.84, p = 0.70) between groups for 
their decisions in tactical decision two (see Figure 23). There was a trend (Z = 1.03,p = 
0.063) by all participants to choose support-by-fire (n = 19) rather than assault (n = 11).  
 
count 11 count 4 ROW Count 15
total % 36.67% total % 13.33% ROW Total % 50.00%
col % 57.89% col % 36.36%
row % 73.33% row % 26.67%
count 8 count 7 ROW Count 15
total % 26.67% total % 23.33% ROW Total % 50.00%
col % 42.11% col % 63.64%
row % 53.33% row % 46.67%
COL Count 19 COL Count 11






Table 7.   Contingency table for tactical Decision Two, comparison between 
groups  
6. Exploratory Analysis Regarding Hypothesis 1 
Although the sample size was too small to statistically analyze results by 
experience, examining the data with descriptive statistics by experience levels can 
provide worthwhile feedback that may be used in future studies. 
a. Experience and Path Score 
When reviewing total path score, those with higher experience levels scored 
generally better (lower overall path scores) than those of lower experience (higher overall 
path scores) (see Figure 24).  
count 6 count 9 ROW Count 15
total % 20.00% total % 30.00% ROW Total % 50.00%
col % 54.55% col % 47.37%
row % 40.00% row % 60.00%
count 5 count 10 ROW Count 15
total % 16.67% total % 33.33% ROW Total % 50.00%
col % 45.45% col % 52.63%
row % 33.33% row % 66.67%
COL Count 11 COL Count 19
COL Total % 36.67% COL Total% 63.33%





Figure 20.  Average Path Score by experience level  
When path score is examined by experience levels by group, high experience 
level path scores remained relatively unchanged, regardless of whether they were in the 
live or UGV group; mid-level tended to be higher for the UGV group; and low level did 
not really change; but had less standard deviation (see Figure 25). 
 
Figure 21.  Path score by experience and group 
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b. Decisions and Experience Levels  
Comparisons of specific decisions by experience levels demonstrate interesting 
differences that may be used for future studies (see Table 4). 
In movement decision One, higher-experienced participants preferred to follow 
their wingman during the initial movement, whereas low and mid-experienced 
participants chose to lead the movement. Although 10 of 16 mid-level experienced 
participants preferred bounding overwatch in tactical decision one, the high- and low-
level experienced participants were split approximately evenly between bounding 
overwatch (0) and travelling overwatch (1). High- and mid-level experienced participants 
preferred to follow their wingmen in movement decision two, whereas low-level 
experienced participants chose to lead. In tactical decision two, low- and mid-level 
experienced participants preferred support-by-fire, whereas high experienced participants 
choose to conduct the assault. 
 
Table 8.   Contingency tables for movement decisions by experience level 
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C. HYPOTHESIS 2—THE MEAN TIME FOR A DECISION BY EACH 
GROUP WILL BE THE SAME  
There were three outliers for time to complete. The beginning time and end times 
for one participant (Outlier A) could not be recorded, so times are lacking for movement 
decision One, tactical decision two, and scenario completion time. Two other participants 
had long decision times on movement decision One (Outlier B) and tactical decision two 
(Outlier C) that were well beyond three standard deviations from the mean times for 
those decisions. However, as Outliers B and C did not occur because of technical issues, 
their data is considered to be valid. Therefore, times to complete the scenario and 
individual decision times were calculated with and without the respective outliers.  
1. Overall Time to Complete Scenario 
There was no significant difference in the time to complete the scenario between 
groups with Outlier A excluded (F(1,13.6) = 1.177, p = 0.297), with Outlier A and B 
excluded (F(1,15.0) = 0.1549, p = 0.699), or with Outlier A, B, and C omitted (F(1,24.6) 
= 1.101, p = 0.304). 
 
Figure 22.  Mean time to complete scenario by group and experience 
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2. Time for Each Decision by Group 
There was no statistically significant difference between any decision time and 
experience, regardless of whether or not outliers were included (all p’s > .30) (Table 9). 
 
Table 9.   Mean time and standard deviation (SD), in minutes, by group and 
decision  
3. Exploratory Analysis Regarding Hypothesis 2 
Table 10 depicts the mean decision times by level of experience. When the 
outliers are removed, decision times did not vary by experience level (all p’s > .30).  
 
Table 10.   Mean time and standard deviation (SD), in minutes, by experience 
and decision  
 
LIVE 1.348 (4.152) 2.427 (0.195) 0.093 (0.053) 1.798 (0.437) 5.888 (4.584)
UGV 0.350 (0.142) 2.447 (0.342) 0.159 (0.191) 1.589 (0.139) 4.544 (0.706)
LIVE 1.444 (4.292) 1.926 (1.680) 4.759 (1.852)
UGV 0.350 (0.142) 1.589 (0.537) 4.544 (0.706)
LIVE 0.297 (0.118) 1.496 (0.503) 5.527 (4.559)
UGV 0.350 (0.142) 1.589 (0.537) 4.544 (0.706)
4.274 (0.632)
4.544 (0.706)
Time to Complete (MD1 Omitted)
Time to Complete (TD2 Omitted)
Time to Complete (2 Outliers Omitted)
Decision time by decision and group
Time To Complete
1 Outlier Omitted 1 Outlier Omitted
2 Outliers Omitted 2 Outliers Omitted
Movement Decision 1 Tactical Decision 1 Movement Decision 2 Tactical Decision 2
High 0.300 (0.159) 2.452 (0.188) 2.452 (0.188) 1.315 (0.707) 4.381 (0.583)
Mid 1.256 (3.892) 2.441 (0.337) 2.441 (0.337) 1.847 (1.563) 5.704 (4.184)
Low 0.343 (0.134) 2.403 (0.156) 2.403 (0.156) 1.777 (0.298) 4.593 (0.249)
High 0.343 (0.111) 1.502 (0.505) 4.381 (0.583)
Mid 1.256 (3.892) 1.847 (1.563) 4.775 (1.740)
Low 0.343 (0.134) 1.777 (0.298) 4.593 (0.249)
High 0.343 (0.111) 1.502 (0.505) 4.381 (0.583)
Mid 0.313 (0.145) 1.493 (0.573) 5.399 (4.122)





Time to Complete (MD1 Omitted)
Time to Complete (TD2 Omitted)
Decision time by decision and experience





Movement Decision 1 Tactical Decision 1 Movement Decision 2 Tactical Decision 2
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D. HYPOTHESIS 3—THE CONFIDENCE LEVEL OF EACH GROUP WILL 
BE THE SAME. 
1. Confidence by Group 
There was no statistically significant difference (t(28) = 0.533, p = 0.598) in 
participant confidence in their decisions between groups (see Figure 32). Regarding 
experience level and confidence, the average confidence seemed to coincide with a 
participant’s experience level. Individuals of higher experience tended to be more 
confident. 
 
Figure 23.  Graphical representation of confidence by group for each level of 
experience 
E. POST-EXPERIMENT SURVEY RESULTS 
Three questions from the post survey were analyzed to gain insights into 
participants’ level of trust in their wingmen and what aspects (expected actions, 
knowledge of situation, and accuracy of information) of their wingman they trusted most 
or least.  
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1. Percentage of Trust in Wingman by Group 
There was no significant difference (t(28) = 0.900, p = 0.376) in the percentage of 
trust in the wingmen between groups. Although there was no significant difference, the 
average trust for the UGV group was lower than that of the live group. 
 
Figure 24.  Average percentage of trust in wingman by group 
2. Trust in Autonomous Systems 
There was no significant difference (X
2
(1) = 0.687, p = 0.407) between groups in 
whether or not a participant trusted an autonomous system (see Figure 34). Regardless of 
group,  the trend was to trust the wingman (Z = 1.81, p = 0.0702).  
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Figure 25.  Trust in autonomous systems (Yes or No) by group 
3. Aspects Most or Least Trusted in Wingman by Group 
There was a statistically significant difference (X
2
(2) = 11.826, p = 0.003) in the 
aspects of a wingman that were trusted most between groups. The live group was 
relatively evenly distributed between all three aspects (accuracy of information, expected 
actions, knowledge of situation), whereas a majority of the UGV group’s responses 
indicated that they trusted that the UGV would act as expected (see Figure 35). 
 
Figure 26.  Aspects trusted most about wingman by group 
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There was a statistically significant difference (X
2
(2) = 7.650, p = 0.022) in the 
aspects of a wingman that were trusted least between groups. The live group was 
relatively evenly distributed between all three aspects trusted least, though the group 
appeared to lean toward expected actions and knowledge of situation as being least 
trusted. The majority of the UGV group’s responses indicated that they did not trust the 
UGV’s knowledge of the situation (see Figure 35). 
 
Figure 27.  Aspects trusted least about wingman by group 
4. Exploratory Analysis Regarding Post-Experiment Survey Results 
As Figure 28 depicts, there was no significant difference between experience 
levels for the percentage a participant’s wingman was trusted. However, participants of 
mid-level and low experience leaned toward trusting autonomous systems whereas high 
experience participants were evenly distributed (see Figure 29). When we examine the 
data regarding aspects most or least trusted in wingmen, we see that high- and low-level 
experienced participants most frequently chose expected actions as what they trusted 
most and knowledge of situation as what they trusted least. Mid-level participants most 
frequently chose accuracy of information as what they trusted most and selected 




Figure 28.  Average percentage of trust in wingman by experience level 
 
 
Figure 29.  Trust in autonomous systems (Yes or No) by experience 
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A. OVERVIEW OF STUDY AND SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
The purpose of this study was to determine if tactical leaders make different types 
of decisions when using an automated wingman versus a live wingman. The study 
attempted to use a virtual environment to present a participant with a conventional small 
unit or tactical combat scenario in which the participant was required to make critical 
decisions about how to maneuver and fight using either a live or an automated wingman. 
The UGV used in the scenario was semi-autonomous; a term used in the study to mean 
that key critical tasks required a human-in-the-loop for execution. The live wingman was 
a computer represented entity that reacted in the same way as the UGV to the decision 
stimulus of the participant. Participants were also blocked by level of tactical experience.  
Results regarding decisions made, time to make decisions, and level of confidence 
in decisions consistently indicated no significant differences between live wingmen and 
UGV wingman groups. The lack of statistical significance suggests that a greater level of 
trust may exist toward automated systems than previously thought: Participants with a 
UGV wingman made the same decisions, primarily for the same reasons, in the same 
amount of time with the same level of confidence as participants with a live wingman.  
Indeed, survey results indicate that individuals are willing to trust autonomous 
systems. This willingness, however, is extremely contingent upon meeting several 
criteria. Of the 22 participants who answered that they would trust an autonomous system 
in the context that it was presented; only one indicated that he would trust an autonomous 
system with no caveat. Fifteen of the 22 who said they would trust an autonomous system 
said they would only trust an unmanned ground vehicle in limited missions that did not 
require complex decisions or actions, and they would require human-in-the-loop vice 
purely autonomous systems. Although leaders’ decisions did not differ when using an 
automated system in this scenario, further tests are required to see if decisions differ 
when an automated system is used in a more complex situation, such as an urban 
environment. 
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1. Implications of Exploratory Analysis of Experience 
In general, the higher a participant’s experience level, the better his or her path 
score. This did not, however, translate to all high-experienced participants returning the 
expected responses for every decision. Typically, higher experienced individuals did tend 
to choose to follow in their movement decisions, but they were split on whether to 
conduct the expected decision of bounding overwatch or the less-expected decision of 
travelling overwatch. Higher experienced individuals also tended to choose to conduct 
the assault. The divergence from expected responses, then, was mostly due to the split in 
bounding or travelling overwatch, at least for higher experienced individuals. Those who 
had mid-level experience tended to choose to lead initially, but then would choose to 
follow after contact with the enemy. They also tended toward bounding overwatch and 
would more often choose to act as the support-by-fire element in an assault on enemy 
infantry. Low-experienced participants tended to choose to be the lead throughout the 
scenario and were split between bounding and travelling overwatch. Low-experienced 
individuals also choose to act as the support-by-fire.  
Reasons for decisions were relatively the same between experience groups, 
usually referring to an attempt to maintain command and control in accordance with the 
participants’ understanding of doctrine or as a means for ensuring situational awareness 
for them or their wingmen. The largest area of difference was in bounding and travelling 
overwatch. How a person interpreted the mission greatly impacted the decision to 
conduct bounding or travelling overwatch. Most participants who chose travelling 
overwatch indicated that the reason for their choice was due to an attempt to maintain 
speed, thus necessitating travelling overwatch versus bounding overwatch. Regardless of 
their choices, most cited doctrine as their reason for the choice they made, which 
necessitated a change in formation. The difference between bounding and travelling 
overwatch came down to an interpretation of whether speed was needed or not. The one 
discrepancy in tactical decision two was a single participant who chose to conduct the 
defense. The participant chose the defense versus travelling or bounding overwatch 
because of his interpretation of the mission. Because he thought that contact with a 
mounted platform meant he had a company-sized element to his front, he chose the 
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defense as a means to allow his superiors to provide a new assessment and send 
reinforcements. Again, this participant’s decision was based solely on his interpretation 
of the mission and doctrinal response rather than any bias toward an unmanned ground 
vehicle. In fact, there was only one respondent who provided distrust in the automated 
wingman as a reason for his decisions. This individual, who was in the high-experience 
group, chose to lead in both movement decisions, chose bounding overwatch, and chose 
to conduct the support-by-fire. Because the sample size was so small, we cannot know if 
this was a trend across more experienced participants that may have a significant effect 
on how automated ground systems are utilized in the future. 
 
Figure 31.  Mean decision times by group and experience 
2. Should VBS2 be Used for Testing Future Tactical Concepts 
Regarding UGVs? 
Using VBS2 to conduct an experiment like this one is relatively new. Therefore, it 
can be of benefit to explore what were found to be the benefits and drawbacks of using 
VBS2 in an academic study.  
The benefit of VBS2 was that it was relatively easy to use for this application. 
The scripting characteristics were difficult for a novice programmer, but the online 
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resources provided by both Bohemia Interactive and Milgaming made it relatively easy to 
learn and execute the code. Having an automated scenario ensured replication of events 
every time for every participant while also providing a means to electronically capture 
actions and decisions.  
The main drawback of VBS2 is that in order to allow for a more dynamic 
scenario, heavy coding would be needed that most likely would go beyond the 
capabilities of the general programmer. In addition, because a scripting language is being 
used, glitches sometimes develop as additional code is piled on top of the existing VBS2 
code. Sometimes the code created for a mission may not interact well with the existing 
game engine or updated versions, requiring rewrites and causing system faults. Because 
licensing is restricted to the computer for which it is requested, it is difficult if the setup 
has to be changed partway through execution. 
B. LIMITATIONS 
The study had several limitations due to the time required to conduct the study 
and the research team’s lack of experience with preparing the computer-based simulation. 
Some of the limitations included surveying confidence prior to the start, the sample size, 
the use of a faux live wingman, and the lack of a complex mission scenario. 
1. Participant Confidence 
Participant confidence was not measured prior to the conduct of the study. 
Because the degree of confidence a person has in their self can indicate their degree of 
confidence in an autonomous system (Hancock et al., 2011), it should be included in a 
any future studies and was a limitation to the conduct of this study. This information 
could have been used to better weigh the final confidence rating and as a means to 
determine the effects of individual confidence on trust in automated systems for military 
purposes. 
2. Sample Size 
Although no significant differences often existed between groups, interesting 
trends by experience and group*experience emerged. However, due to the lack of sample 
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size within experience levels, these results could not be statistically evaluated. A larger 
sample size should be used to allow for a determination of differences due to experience. 
Furthermore, the sample consisted of a narrow margin of military leaders attending NPS. 
Using a larger military population than the one at NPS to create a more diverse sample 
may also allow blocking by military specialty to assess the types of decisions that might 
be made by a logistician versus a cavalry officer or by a non-commissioned officer 
compared to an officer. 
3. Live Wingman 
Although the faux live wingman provided predictability and repeatability of 
behaviors, it also may allow participants to have doubts about whether the wingman was 
truly live. The study administrators took great pains to mislead the participants into 
thinking the wingman was live; however, the lack of actual radio conversation between 
the two may have mitigated some of the realism in the live group responses.  
4. More Complex Scenario 
As has been stated, there was trust in the wingman primarily because the situation 
was very simple and straightforward. There were no civilians on the battlefield and no 
friendly forces forward of the participant or his or her wingman. Any contact the 
automated wingman made would be with an enemy force. Therefore, to get a better 
understanding of individual decisions and the degree of trust people have in autonomous 
systems, a more complex scenario should be developed requiring participants to make 
decisions that tests their trust in the UGV’s knowledge of the situation, the component 
they trusted the least in this study.  
In addition to increasing the complexity in the scenario itself, the user interface 
should be improved to allow more freedom to maneuver, meaning that participants can 
control the movement of their vehicles and that of their wingmen rather than have the 
vehicles travel on a set path in between decisions. As conducted, the experiment was 
more like a theme park ride, with participants making very limited decisions and then 
riding the tracks until they came to another decision point. Giving the participant the 
ability to control their movement and that of the UGV would allow greater complexity as 
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well as offer a measure of trust by the participant in the automaton’s path planning 
capability. This scenario could be accomplished by using the 2D map interface to select 
routes or by networking a driver, gunner, and passenger into the scenario. The driver 
would maneuver the vehicle as per the commander’s direction, the gunner would engage 
targets as directed, and the passenger would control the movements and activities of the 
UGV in a human-in-the-loop interface. 
5. Truly Autonomous Systems 
The use of a virtual environment allows an opportunity to test truly autonomous 
capabilities early before development. This study should be expanded to provide a 
complete autonomous capability that will allow future autonomous system developers to 
flush out what interfaces, information, and tools are required for leaders to use and work 
with unmanned, completely autonomous systems. 
C. AREAS OF FUTURE WORK 
The purpose of this study was to determine how leader’s decisions differ 
depending on if they have a live wingman or an automated wingman. This study was 
conducted based on a ground combat scenario utilizing a desktop simulation. There are 
many opportunities for others to carry this work forward. 
Decision making is not just a tactical task. There may be differences in how 
leaders of larger units assign mission tasks due to the use of unmanned vehicles. The 
assignment of unmanned systems can overlap into many different high-level command 
structures for various military services. For example, a similar VBS2 simulation could be 
used by the Marine Corps to explore how a Marine Expeditionary Force commander 
might use unmanned amphibious vehicles to conduct an amphibious assault. The Navy 
could explore how decisions are made by a ship commander when he or she has the use 
of unmanned submersibles. The use of unmanned systems within the military is growing 
and there is a need to understand how others might use those systems and how the use of 
those systems may affect their decisions in the future. 
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Further studies should be conducted in decision making and what information is 
required to make those decisions. By utilizing eye tracking and an electroencephalogram, 
insight could be gained into what type of information is actually stimulating a person’s 
decisions. The use of both those capabilities within this study could have provided 
information about what participants looked at in the UGV window to determine their 
decision choices. Likewise, these capabilities could be used in any number of simulations 
that provide a visual stimulus to determine trends in what people look at to make a 
decision and what their brain activity suggests about their personal state (sleepy, engaged, 
etc.) when they make the decision. 
Finally, this study could be expanded to explore group decisions with UGVs in 
which one crew or team member is controlling the UGV. By networking a similar 
scenario, an actual vehicle crew could be replicated complete with a UGV operator. The 
crew would then have input on how the UGV was used, and the leader would not be 
giving commands to an automated system, but to a human who is controlling the 
automated system. The networked crew could then be coupled with another networked 
crew so that two crews and two UGVs could replicate an augmented platoon formation of 
four tanks, Bradleys, or HMMWVs. Not only would this allow for a more dynamic and 
complex scenario, but it would provide valuable data on how group decisions are made 
and how UGVs may be utilized more than in the currently existing format. This 
information would be directly applicable to current design and development of UGVs for 
use within the next five to ten years.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The key finding from this study is that in a simple tactical scenario, tactical 
leaders tend to make the same decisions regardless of whether their wingmen are UGVs 
or live. A second key result is that military members are at least willing to utilize 
unmanned ground systems in certain combat situations. A great deal of technological 
growth and proving of technology will need to occur, however. The increased exposure 
and experience of military personnel with autonomous systems appears to have increased 
the level of trust in these systems, at least for very basic non-ambiguous, situations.  
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Some key actions must occur in order for future unmanned systems to be trusted 
to the extent that leaders will make unbiased decisions representative of this study. First, 
there must be an ability to have a human-in-the-loop. Even if a system eventually 
becomes completely reliable as a truly autonomous system, for trust to be possible there 
must be a way for a human to interact with the system to stop unexpected actions or 
thwart actions caused by a cyber-attack. Developers must continue to incrementally 
expose Soldiers and leaders to unmanned systems early (and often within their training), 
otherwise the unmanned systems will not be trusted in combat, if utilized at all. Lastly, 
there will need to be extensive studies and proofing of the technology to ensure that it 








APPENDIX A. ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDE 
  
SETUP Checklist: 
o Generate Subject ID  
o Update subject List 
o Input Subject ID into  
o initNew.sqf 
o Subject Data Tracker 
o Subject Survey Documents 
o Update IP Address in initNew.sqf 
o Update Subject Folder in Computer 
o Conduct Trial run 
Script: 
 Thank you for being part of the study.  The purpose of this study is to gain insight into tactical 
level decision making.  Specifically, we are also looking at the types of decisions people make when 
working with a live person, versus working with one that is automated.  The scenario you will take part 
in is that of a Bradley Section leader.  Depending on your study group, you will work with either a live 
wingman, or an automated wingman.  Eye-tracking and EEG readings, combined with your decisions in 
the scenario and questionnaire, will allow us to better determine what sensory information is required, 
or can be used, to aide decision making.  This will be used to help future development of Mission 
Command Systems as well as future Unmanned Systems.   
Before I assign you to a study group I will need to have you fill out a consent form, sign in for 
your subject ID, provide some basic demographic information, and conduct some questionnaires.  It is 
important for me to tell you that your information will be maintained in the strictest confidence.  You 
will be assigned a subjectID that will be utilized in the data so that you cannot be linked to the 
information provided.  Your personal information that identifies you will be maintained separately, in a 
secure location, and will only be used as a means to contact you during the course of the study, should 
we need to review any information or conduct any follow-ups.  After the study has completed, your 
information will be disposed of within regulatory guidance to protect your identity and participation.  
This study is wholly voluntary and does contain some graphic battlefield scenes, if for any reason, you 
feel that you can no longer continue, or no longer want to participate, you are fully within your rights to 
stop and remove yourself from the study.   None of your results or information will be used for the study 
and will be disposed in accordance with all regulatory guidance. 
 In front of you , you will find a subject packet which should correspond to your subjectID, 
#________.   Please verify that your subjectID is correct at the top right of each page within the packet.  
During the course of the study, you will conduct two survey’s and a small quiz.  The first survey will gain 
some basic demographic information so that we can better judge what may have influenced your 
decision making.  You will then conduct a basic quiz of tactical knowledge.  Because we cannot create a 
scenario that matches the terms and methods of every service, the study was established using US Army 




relate to the terminology and techniques expressed within the study, mitigating any issues that may be 
caused by the use of unfamiliar terminology.  Once complete, you will be fitted for the EEG and both the 
EEG and eye tracking systems will be calibrated to you.   
 At this time, please pull out the Pre-survey and Tactical Knowledge Quiz form your packet.  All 
other documents can be placed back in the folder.   Fill out the survey and let the administrator, either 
myself or Mr Huston, know when you are complete. 
<Fill Out the Survey and Quiz> 
Now that you are complete with the surveys, Mr. Huston will fit you with the EEG and calibrate 
the systems.  While he is doing that, I will use the information from your pre-survey and quiz to place 
you into your study group and initialize the study scenario. 
 We are using Virtual Battlefield Simulation 2 as our study medium, this is a networked first 
person serious-game, or game-for-training.  You will use a mouse to interact with the screen to conduct 
any in game actions or decision making.  Next to the first-person view you will also see a google map 
with tactical graphics.  This map will show your location as well as your wingman.  If your wingman sees 
an enemy target, they will attempt to populate the enemy on your map much like they would using an 
FBCB2 (Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below).  We have provided a brief training scenario to 
allow you to become familiar with the program.  I will start the training scenario for you now.  When you 
are ready, please start the training scenario. 
 Okay, good job, do you feel that you understand the mechanics, or do you need to conduct the 
training scenario again?   
 You are going to be in the _________ group, your wingman will be _____________. 
 I have setup the mission for you and we are ready to begin.  Please start at your convenience. 
 Very good job, you have now completed the experiment stage, we just need to complete 
another short questionnaire and conduct your debriefing and then we will be done. 
 Here is your questionnaire, I will be checking on the data, but please let me or Mr. Huston know 
when you are done, or if you have any questions. 
 <Fill out questionnaire> 
 Now that you are done, I can debrief you.  You were part of the ___________ group.    
<LIVE GROUP>  
 Your wingman was actually an autonomous agent.  We attempted to deceive you in order to provide a 
more direct comparison to how people make decisions when using a live or autonomous system.  To do 
this, we had to ensure that the live agent and the autonomous agent acted the same in both scenarios.  




they were working with a UGV versus a live person, this method ensured more commonality 
between scenarios and wingman actions.  Please do not impart this knowledge to anyone else that 
would be a possible candidate for this study as having this knowledge previously would seriously 
jeopardize the validity of the study.  If you do not agree with our deception, you may opt to withdraw 
from the study, and we can omit all data we collected from you.  Would you like to opt out of the study? 
Would you like to know how you did in your decision making? 
 Yes – The data we have so far, is very preliminary and there is no necessarily right or wrong 
answers in how you conduct this scenario; but we did evaluate all the choices to provide a scoring 
criteria of what paths stayed the closest to US Army doctrine.  Like golf, a low score is better, whereas a 
high score (the max is 9) indicates a less desired path choice.  If you would like the final results of the 
study, I will send the completed thesis to you after it has been approved by the Thesis department. 
<UGV GROUP>   
Your wingman was actually an autonomous agent, but so was the live group.  We attempted to 
deceive those individuals in the live group in order to provide a more direct comparison to how people 
make decisions when using a live or autonomous system.  To do this, we had to ensure that the live 
agent and the autonomous agent acted the same in both scenarios.  While we could have used a live 
confederate and deceived the UGV group into believing they were working with a UGV versus a live 
person, this method ensured more commonality between scenarios and wingman actions.  Please do 
not impart this knowledge to anyone else that would be a possible candidate for this study as having this 
knowledge previously would seriously jeopardize the validity of the study.  If you do not agree with our 
deception, you may opt to withdraw from the study, and we can omit all data we collected from you.  
Would you like to opt out of the study? 
Would you like to know how you did in your decision making? 
 Yes – The data we have so far, is very preliminary and there is no necessarily right or wrong 
answers in how you conduct this scenario; but we did evaluate all the choices to provide a scoring 
criteria of what paths stayed the closest to US Army doctrine.  Like golf, a low score is better, whereas a 
high score (the max is 9) indicates a less desired path choice.  If you would like the final results of the 
study, I will send the completed thesis to you after it has been approved by the Thesis department. 
Follow-On Tasks: 
 Open scenario log files and transfer information into study Excel sheet. 
 Clear SubjectID information from .sqf files to prepare for next subject. 
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Subject ID #: ______________ 
What United States Military Service are you? 
US Army US Navy US Marine Corps US Air Force 
What is your Job Category you most associate with based on your entire military service? 
Combat Arms   Special Forces   Service Support  Combat Service Support 
Are you male or female? 
 Male  Female 
What is your Age? ___________ 
Years of Military Service?  __________ 
How many combat tours have you been on?  This applies to Ground Combat Experience into hostile 
areas such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Boznia, etc. 
Average Length of Combat Tours (months)?   
What kind of Mounted Vehicle Experience do you have? 
Tracked Vehicles Wheeled Vehicles Both None 
What percentage of your military service has been mounted? 0 – 100%  ________ 
Were you trained in mounted Combat?  Yes No 
Have you ever been in direct contact with an enemy force while in a mounted vehicle and as a leader? 
Yes Yes, but not as a leader  No 
Was your experience in a conventional fight or in low intensity conflict (COIN, counter-insurgency)? 
Conventional Low Intensity Both N/A 
Have you had any experience with unmanned vehicles?  Circle the response that best represents your 
experience. 
No Used  Operated Directed  Used and Operated 
Used and Directed Operated and Directed   Used, Operated, and Directed 
What percentage of your military service have you used, operated, or directed Unmanned Vehicles? 
0 – 100% ________ 
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APPENDIX C. TACTICAL KNOWLEDGE TEST 
 
 
Subject ID #: ______________ 
Pre-Test of Tactical Knowledge 
1.  What is a Movement To Contact? (Circle one) 
A.  Movement to contact is a type of defensive operation designed to develop the situation and 
establish or regain contact. 
B.  Movement to contact is a type of offensive operation designed to attack known enemy positions. 
C.  Movement to contact is a movement technique designed to allow freedom of movement without 
contact. 
D.  Movement to contact is a type of offensive operation designed to develop the situation and establish 
or regain contact. 
2.  Of the Three Movement Techniques,  Travelling, Travelling-Overwatch, Bounding-Overwatch; what 
are the main differences and when are they used? (Circle One) 
A.  Traveling – used when speed is necessary and contact with enemy forces is not likely. 
      Traveling Overwatch – movement technique when contact with enemy forces is possible, but speed 
is important.  The lead element is continuously moving while the trailing elements move at variable 
speeds, sometimes pausing to overwatch movement of the lead element. 
      Bounding Overwatch - movement technique when contact is expected with enemy forces.  One type 
of bounding overwatch consisting of alternating bounds 
 
B.  Traveling – used when speed is not necessary and contact with the enemy is expected. 
      Traveling Overwatch – movement technique when contact with enemy forces is possible, but speed 
is important.  The lead element is continuously moving while the trailing elements move at variable 
speeds, sometimes pausing to overwatch movement of the lead element. 
      Bounding Overwatch – movement technique when contact is expected with enemy forces.  Two 
types of bounding overwatch: alternating bounds and successive bounds. 
 
C.  Traveling – used when speed is necessary and contact with enemy forces is not likely. 
      Traveling Overwatch – movement technique when contact with enemy forces is possible, but speed 
is important.  The lead element is continuously moving while the trailing elements move at variable 
speeds, sometimes pausing to overwatch movement of the lead element. 
      Bounding Overwatch - movement technique when contact is expected with enemy forces.  Two 
types of bounding overwatch: alternating bounds and successive bounds. 
 
D.  Traveling – used when speed is necessary and contact with the enemy is not likely. 
      Traveling Overwatch – movement technique when contact with enemy forces is possible, but speed 
is important.  The lead element is continuously moving while the trailing elements move at variable 
speeds, sometimes pausing to overwatch movement of the lead element. 
      Bounding Overwatch - movement technique when contact is not expected with enemy forces.  Two 





3. Below are several pictures of Movement Formations. Please indicate where the  Platoon Leader  
would be located in the formations. If there is a difference to their location based on movement  
technique, please list both locations and annotate in parenthesis what movement technique they  





APPENDIX D. POST SURVEY 
 
  
Subject ID #: ______________ 
Post Survey 
All answers are on a scale from 1 – 5, with five being the most confident and 1 being the least 
confidence. 
MD1.  Your decision was__________. 




TD1.  Your decision was__________. 




TD1a.  Did you request more time? 






MD2.  Your decision was__________. 




TD2.  Your decision was__________. 




TD2a.  Did you request more time? 












Would you trust an autonomous System? Why or Why not? By autonomous we mean a system that is 
self-reliant, with no operator directly controlling the system, but which receives guidance from a leader 





Would you like a copy of the study in its final form? 
Yes  No 
Now that you have completed the task, what overall level of confidence do you have in your 
decisions? 
0 – 100% 
What was your level of trust in your wingman? 
0 – 100% 
What aspects did you most trust? 
 Accuracy of Information – the information they provided was timely and correct. 
 Expected Actions – able to execute the task provided in your decision 
 Knowledge of Situation – the wingman knew enough about what was going on around them to 
give adequate information or execute tasks effectively. 
 
What aspects did you least trust? 
 Accuracy of Information – the information they provided was timely and correct. 
 Expected Actions – able to execute the task provided in your decision 
 Knowledge of Situation – the wingman knew enough about what was going on around them to 
give adequate information or execute tasks effectively. 
 81 






APPENDIX F. INFORMED CONSENT 
 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Consent to Participate in Research 
 
Introduction.  You are invited to participate in a research study entitled “A Comparison of Tactical Leader 
Decision Making with Automated or Live Counterparts in a Virtual Environment.”  The purpose of the 
research is to determine if a person’s decisions in tactical situations change based on the use of a live 
wingman versus an automated wingman.  
 
The scenarios used in this study provide a realistic and graphical depiction of combat.  If you have 
been diagnosed with PTSD or feel that you may have PTSD like symptoms you should not participate.  By 
consenting to participate below you acknowledge that you are aware of the risks associated with your 
participation. 
 
Procedures.    
 You will first receive a brief overview of the study and your involvement.  Following the 
brief, you will fill out a standard consent form, providing both written and oral consent to all, 
or part, of the experiment.  After you have filled out the consent form, you will logged into 
the subject log and receive your subject ID number.   Both the subject log and the consent 
form will be maintained in hard copy document only.  These documents are the only place in 
which your name and contact information will appear.  The log and consent form will be 
stored separate from data within a secure location in the Primary Investigator’s office.  All 
other data will be stored electronically on access controlled computers at the Naval 
Postgraduate School.  Data from the experiment will only be referenced using the subject ID 
number.  All data in the final report will be reported in aggregate.   
   You will fill out a pre-survey questionnaire, take a five-minute test to determine your 
baseline tactical experience, and fill out a demographic survey.   
 You will be required to be go through the setup process for the EEG and eye tracking 
devices.  This data will help us understand how leaders may make decisions in a tactical 
environment. Your name will not be on any of the data used by the study, only your subject 
ID number.   
 You will then conduct a familiarization scenario to ensure you understand the controls and 
capabilities within the system.  You will conduct one of two scenarios (Live or UGV) in 
which they will act as the Bradley Section Leader in an Army Game for Training program 
known as Virtual Battlefield Simulation 2 (VBS2).   At the completion of the scenario, you 
will be given a post-experiment survey capturing data necessary to better understand the 
scenario results.  Lastly, you will be debriefed about the experiment, ensuring that you 
understand all aspects of the experiment.  In total, the time for one trial should not exceed 2 
hours.  Between 30-40 other subjects will participate in this research. 
 Data will be reported in aggregate; though specific results may be referenced in academic 
publications with no reference to you, the subject.  Your individual results will not be released to any 
entity or agency and you will never be identified in any publications. 
 There will be no audio or video recording, though the scenario will be recorded using a built-in After 
Action Review tool, in order to synchronize specific data points within the study between the virtual 
environment, the EEG, and the eye-tracking device. 
 

























as a research subject or any other concerns may be addressed to the Navy Postgraduate School IRB Chair, 
Dr. Larry Shattuck, 831-656-2473, lgshattu@nps.edu.  
 
Statement of Consent. I have read the information provided above. I have been given the opportunity to 
ask questions and all the questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I have been provided a copy of 
this form for my records and I agree to participate in this study. I understand that by agreeing to 
participate in this research and signing this form, I do not waive any of my legal rights. 
 
 
________________________________________  __________________ 
Participant’s Signature     Date 
 
 
________________________________________  __________________ 
Researcher’s Signature     Date 
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Thank you for partaking in the study.  
Task: 
Your task is to act as the Section leader for a Bradley 
Section that is conducting a Situational Tactical Exercise 
(STX). You, and your wingman will maneuver through the 




A dismounted Infantry Squad, consisting of 9 dismounts, is 
believed to be moving from North to South through your 
AO. They are part of a larger Yurogazian force comprised 
of two Infantry Company's and one Mechanized 
Reconnaissance Company. The Yurogazian's have very few 
actual mechanized vehicles and generally will stage them 
forward, relying on the speed of their wheeled vehicles to get 




Conduct a movement to contact South to North from Phase 
Line Dakota (LD) to the LOA in order to identify and/or 
destroy any enemy threat moving through the region. The 
commander's intent is that the region is free of any enemy 
forces. 
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APPENDIX H. LEVEL OF EXPERIENCE METRIC 
A participant’s experience level only determines the subjects experience level as 
it relates to the study. Therefore, a person with a considerable number of years of service, 
but no mounted experience or unmanned vehicle experience, may still be classified as 
middle or low experience. 
A. Demographic weighting parameters 
To determine the experience level of each subject, their demographic data they 
provided and their tactical knowledge tests were combined to provide a score ranging 
from 0 to 412. The levels of experience were broken down so that high scores range from 
412 to 285. Middle scores range from 284 to 155. Low scores range from 156 to 0. In 
order to calculate a score, the various possible answers provided by the demographic 
survey were weighted out of a range from 0 to 100 based on the following distribution: 
 
Table 11.   Experience metric weighting scale 
All scores were evaluated individually and provided a score ranging from 0 to a 
max, in one case, of 7. Some demographic answers had to be combined to provide more 
Years of Service 20
Mounted Exp 5










Tactical Knowledge Test 20
Weighting Scale
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relative responses and quantifiable results. Figure 32 shows the evaluation metrics are for 
each category along with any calculations performed. 
 
Figure 32.  Experience scores for demographic characteristics 
The resulting scores per demographic category were then summed based on the 
weighting scheme to provide a general idea of how experienced the participant was in the 
critical aspects of this study. The final experience rating was determined using the 
following formula: 
 




The three experience levels, “High”, “Mid”, and “Low” were determined to be 
relatively equally distributed but with a slightly larger range for low level of experience 
in order to ensure key attributes (such as mounted or unmanned system experience) had 
to be present to achieve mid to high level experience ratings. 
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APPENDIX I. DETAILED DEPICTION OF HUD 
 
Figure 33.  Live (left) and UGV (right) HUD depictions with explanation of 
characteristics 
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SUPPLEMENTAL A. VIRTUAL BATTLESPACE 2 SCRIPTS 
Script files for the study are too large to place in a single document. VBS2 creates 
a set of files whenever a scenario is created using the simulations mission planning 
editor. These files are stored in “MPMissions,” within the VBS2 folder that is stored in 
the computer’s “Documents” folder. The supplemental contains the entire set of VBS2 
code, both that created by VBS2 and that created by the design team, to allow for a 
person with reasonable knowledge of VBS2 to conduct the experiment.  A flow chart is 
included in Figure 32 to provide a better understanding of how the primary files are 
utilized. 
 
FIGURE 34.  Primary VBS2 script flow 
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SUPPLEMENTAL B. WEBSOCKET GATEWAY 
The websocket gateway was created by Professor Donald McGregor, a Research 
Associate at the Naval Postgraduate school. He modified the code to allow for 
multithreading and the project team modified the index.htm file to allow for google maps 
to represent a 2D 1:50,000 map display of unit movements within the simulation. The file 
was coded using Netbeans and is a mixture of Java and Javascript. The code is open 
source, but is intended for limited academic use in order to stay in compliance with 
google licensing practices which allow for the use of their google maps protocols.  
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